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AFGHANISTAN: THE LONG, HARD ROAD  
TO THE 2014 TRANSITION 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Plagued by factionalism and corruption, Afghanistan is far 
from ready to assume responsibility for security when U.S. 
and NATO forces withdraw in 2014. That makes the po-
litical challenge of organising a credible presidential election 
and transfer of power from President Karzai to a successor 
that year all the more daunting. A repeat of previous elec-
tions’ chaos and chicanery would trigger a constitutional 
crisis, lessening chances the present political dispensation 
can survive the transition. In the current environment, pro-
spects for clean elections and a smooth transition are slim. 
The electoral process is mired in bureaucratic confusion, 
institutional duplication and political machinations. Elec-
toral officials indicate that security and financial concerns 
will force the 2013 provincial council polls to 2014. There 
are alarming signs Karzai hopes to stack the deck for a 
favoured proxy. Demonstrating at least will to ensure clean 
elections could forge a degree of national consensus and 
boost popular confidence, but steps toward a stable transi-
tion must begin now to prevent a precipitous slide toward 
state collapse. Time is running out. 
Institutional rivalries, conflicts over local authority and 
clashes over the role of Islam in governance have caused 
the country to lurch from one constitutional crisis to the 
next for nearly a decade. As foreign aid and investment 
decline with the approach of the 2014 drawdown, so, too, 
will political cohesion in the capital. To ensure political 
continuity and a stable security transition, action to correct 
flaws in the electoral framework and restore credibility to 
electoral and judicial institutions is needed well before the 
presidential and provincial council polls. Tensions have 
already begun to mount between the president and the 
Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of the National Assembly), 
as debate over electoral and other key legal reforms heats 
up. Opposition demands for changes to the structures of 
the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) and Elec-
toral Complaints Commission (ECC) and an overhaul of 
the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) election mech-
anism have become more vigorous by the day.  
There is also, as yet, no sign of an agreement on the tim-
ing of the 2014 elections or the following year’s parlia-
mentary elections, though President Karzai insisted on 4 
October that the former would be held on time and “with-
out interruption”. The IEC has hedged on publicly an-
nouncing the planned postponement of the provincial 
council polls, for fear that such an announcement could 
deepen the political crisis. At a minimum, the IEC must 
announce a timetable and a plan for the 2014 elections that 
adhere closely to constitutional requirements by December 
2012, and a new IEC chairman must be selected to replace 
the outgoing chairman, whose term expires in April 2013, 
as well as a new chief electoral officer. 
It is a near certainty that under current conditions the 
2014 elections will be plagued by massive fraud. Vote 
rigging in the south and east, where security continues to 
deteriorate, is all but guaranteed. High levels of violence 
across the country before and on the day of the polls are 
likely to disenfranchise hundreds of thousands more 
would-be voters. The IEC will likely be forced to throw 
out many ballots. This would risk another showdown be-
tween the executive, legislature and judiciary. Under the 
current constitution and electoral laws, the government is 
not equipped to cope with legal challenges to polling re-
sults. Nearly a decade after the first election, parliament 
and the president remain deeply divided over the respon-
sibilities of constitutionally-mandated electoral institu-
tions. The IEC, its credibility badly damaged after the 
fraudulent 2009 and 2010 elections, is struggling to rede-
fine its role as it works to reform existing laws. There is 
also still considerable disagreement over whether the 
ECC should take the lead in arbitrating election-related 
complaints.  
It will be equally important to decide which state institu-
tion has final authority to adjudicate constitutional dis-
putes before the elections. The uncertainty surrounding 
the responsibilities of the Supreme Court versus those of 
the constitutionally-mandated Independent Commission 
for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Consti-
tution (ICSIC) proved to be a critical factor in the Sep-
tember 2010 parliamentary polls. The Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision to establish a controversial special 
tribunal on elections raised serious questions about its 
own impartiality. Institutional rivalries between the high 
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court and ICSIC have increased considerably since then, 
with the Wolesi Jirga aggressively championing the lat-
ter’s primacy in opposition to the president.  
The tug of war between these two constitutionally-mandated 
institutions has extended to Supreme Court appointments; 
two of nine positions on the bench are held by judges 
whose terms have already expired, and the terms of three 
more expire in 2013. The ICSIC faces similar questions 
about its legitimacy, since only five of its required seven 
commissioners have been appointed by the president and 
approved by parliament. Ambiguities over the roles of the 
Supreme Court and the constitutional commission must 
be resolved well before the presidential campaign begins 
in earnest in early 2013. An important first step would be 
to appoint the required judges and commissioners.  
Institutional rivalry between the high court and the consti-
tutional commission, however, can no more be resolved by 
presidential decree than it can by a simple parliamentary 
vote. Constitutional change will ultimately be necessary to 
restore the Supreme Court’s independence and to estab-
lish clear lines of authority between it and the ICSIC. Even 
if wholesale constitutional change is not possible in the 
near term, legal measures must be adopted within the next 
year to minimise the impact of institutional rivalry over elec-
toral disputes and to ensure continuity between the end of 
Karzai’s term and the start of the next president’s term.  
Although Karzai has signalled his intent to exit gracefully, 
fears remain that he may, directly or indirectly, act to ensure 
his family’s continued majority ownership stake in the po-
litical status quo. This must be avoided. It is critical to keep 
discord over election results to a minimum; any move to 
declare a state of emergency in the event of a prolonged 
electoral dispute would be catastrophic. The political sys-
tem is too fragile to withstand an extension of Karzai’s 
mandate or an electoral outcome that appears to expand his 
family’s dynastic ambitions. Either would risk harming 
negotiations for a political settlement with the armed and 
unarmed opposition. It is highly unlikely a Karzai-brokered 
deal would survive under the current constitutional scheme, 
in which conflicts persist over judicial review, distribution 
of local political power and the role of Islamic law in 
shaping state authority and citizenship. Karzai has con-
siderable sway over the system, but his ability to leverage 
the process to his advantage beyond 2014 has limits. The 
elections must be viewed as an opportunity to break with 
the past and advance reconciliation.  
Quiet planning should, nonetheless, begin now for the 
contingencies of postponed elections and/or imposition of 
a state of emergency in the run up to or during the presiden-
tial campaign season in 2014. The international community 
must work with the government to develop an action plan 
for the possibility that elections are significantly delayed 
or that polling results lead to prolonged disputes or a run-
off. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
should likewise be prepared to organise additional support 
to Afghan forces as needed in the event of an election post-
ponement or state of emergency; its leadership would also 
do well to assess its own force protection needs in such an 
event well in advance of the election.  
All this will require more action by parliament, less inter-
ference from the president and greater clarity from the ju-
diciary. Failure to move on these fronts could indirectly 
lead to a political impasse that would provide a pretext for 
the declaration of a state of emergency, a situation that 
would likely lead to full state collapse. Afghan leaders 
must recognise that the best guarantee of the state’s sta-
bility is its ability to guarantee the rule of law during the 
political and military transition in 2013-2014. If they fail 
at this, that crucial period will at best result in deep divi-
sions and conflicts within the ruling elite that the Afghan 
insurgency will exploit. At worst, it could trigger extensive 
unrest, fragmentation of the security services and perhaps 
even a much wider civil war. Some possibilities for genuine 
progress remain, but the window for action is narrowing. 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
To assure a peaceful political transition in 2014 
To the Independent Elections Commission (IEC):  
1. Announce no later than December 2012 a date for 
the 2014 presidential election and publicly outline a 
realistic timetable for the launch of a new voter reg-
istry program.  
2. Conduct jointly with the ELECT II support program 
of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) a fea-
sibility study on modifying the voting mechanism to 
include a mixed system that combines proportional 
representation with the Single Non-Transferable Vote 
(SNTV) system as an interim step; and undertake an 
evaluation of prospects for a gradual move to full pro-
portional representation by 2019. 
To the Parliament:  
3. Reach internal consensus before April 2013 on re-
forms to the electoral law and the law on the structure 
of the IEC; negotiate a compromise with the president 
on such critical issues as seat allocations for nomadic 
tribal groups (kuchis) and women and a move to a 
mixed voting mechanism; and use this period also to 
revise areas of the law that will impact the presidential 
election, as well as to restore credibility to key insti-
tutions such as the IEC and the Electoral Complaints 
Commission (ECC).  
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4. Clarify the roles of the Supreme Court and the ICSIC 
both in law and in practice by August 2013; adopt 
amendments to the 2008 law on the mandate and 
functions of the ICSIC that further outline its role in 
interpreting the constitution; work with the president 
to strike a swift compromise on candidates to replace 
judges with expired and expiring terms on the Supreme 
Court by August 2013, so that it has a full complement 
for the crucial year of 2014. 
To the international community, in particular the 
U.S., European Union (EU), UK, International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and other main 
donor institutions:  
5. Maintain aid commitments in support of the election, 
contingent on the Afghan government meeting key 
benchmarks for reform; consider, if benchmarks are 
not met, withholding related funding so as to spur the 
Afghan government to action; and coordinate better, 
including with the UN Assistance Mission to Afghan-
istan (UNAMA), their support for elections.  
6. Begin contingency planning immediately to ensure 
adequate security for the necessary number of voting 
centres, as well as for the possibility that elections are 
postponed and/or a state of emergency is declared 
before or during the 2014 presidential campaign; U.S. 
military leaders in ISAF and political leaders in Wash-
ington should be especially wary of the temptation to 
allow the military drawdown to dictate the pace and 
shape of the presidential, provincial council and par-
liamentary polls.  
Kabul/Brussels, 8 October 2012
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AFGHANISTAN: THE LONG, HARD ROAD  
TO THE 2014 TRANSITION 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CLASHES & 
ELECTORAL CONTROVERSIES 
Since the first constitution was promulgated in 1923, Af-
ghanistan has struggled to reconcile its history of legal 
pluralism, in which strains of statutory law, Islamic law 
and customary justice have frequently clashed. Longstand-
ing disagreements over the role of Islam in shaping the 
legal order and structure of government, tensions over the 
distribution of power at the national and local levels and 
ambiguous judicial review principles have consistently 
undermined the cohesiveness of the constitutional order.
1
 
Conflicts over the authority of the executive versus the 
power of the parliament and protections for minorities and 
women, as well as barriers to political participation, have 
formed the substance of most political debate. From the 
monarchy to the Soviet-backed regime and the Taliban’s 
Islamic emirate, successive constitutions have raised fun-
damental questions about which institutions or individu-
als have the power to decide whether a law is sufficiently 
Islamic, the limits of citizenship and protections afforded 
to those deemed vulnerable to exploitation and those deemed 
to lie outside the Muslim community.  
Ethnic and tribal rivalries have further complicated matters, 
with local religious leaders, tribal elders and strongmen 
frequently relying on competing customary law practices 
to resolve disputes, often without regard to either Sharia or 
constitutional requirements. The country has consistently 
failed to progress toward a constitutional order that allows 
minorities, women and other vulnerable individuals to join 
the majority in influencing public policy and to enjoy fair 
application of the law. Repeated governmental failures to 
conduct comprehensive public consultations on its many 
 
1
 Crisis Group has extensively analysed the deficits in Afghani-
stan’s constitutional order and the long-term implications for 
political settlement of the conflict, most notably in Asia Re-
ports N°221, Talking About Talks: Towards a Political Settle-
ment in Afghanistan, 26 March 2012; N°195, Reforming Af-
ghanistan’s Broken Judiciary, 17 November 2010; and N°56, 
Afghanistan’s Flawed Constitutional Process, 12 June 2003; 
and Asia Briefings N°117, Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate, 
23 February 2011; and N°29, Afghanistan: The Constitutional 
Loya Jirga, 12 December 2003. 
constitutions have likewise fuelled conflict. Throughout 
the country’s history, its leaders have failed to include 
sufficient institutional safeguards. There have been few 
provisions for separation of powers in the nine constitu-
tions adopted by various regimes over the last 89 years.
2
 
The evolution of constitutionalism has been characterised by 
cycles of revolt and regime collapse that gradually metas-
tasised into full-blown civil war following the unsuccessful 
attempt to establish a constitutional monarchy in 1964.
3
  
Under the 1964 constitution, the legislature (Shura) was a 
bicameral body with 214 members in the Wolesi Jirga 
(lower house) and 84 members in the Meshrano Jirga 
(upper house). Wolesi Jirga members were directly elected 
by single-member districts.
4
 The Meshrano Jirga member-
ship was divided into thirds, with one third directly elected, 
one third appointed by the king for a five-year period and 
one third appointed by each provincial council. Legal 
prohibitions against political parties, however, prevented 
the Shura from actively forming alliances to push through 
legislation, and for the bulk of its existence (1965-1973), it 
was paralysed.
5
 This might have been remedied by a con-
stitutional amendment or supplementary laws that would 
have given greater freedom for party formation. Indeed, 
articles pertaining to a Loya Jirga (grand council), consist-
ing of both chambers of the Shura and the chairman of 
each provincial council, provided for such an amendment 
process. But in practice the king’s power to dissolve the leg-
islature
6
 and the comparative lack of constraints in forming 
such a Loya Jirga made it too unwieldy to be useful.  
 
2
 There is some debate as to the actual number of constitutions 
that have been ratified. In preparing its analysis, Crisis Group 
gave primary consideration to those promulgated in 1923, 1931, 
1964, 1977, 1980, 1987, 1990, 1992 and 2004.  
3
 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Islam and its Shari’a in the Af-
ghan Constitution 2004 with Special Reference to Personal Law”, 
in The Shari’a in the Constitutions of Afghanistan, Iran and 
Egypt – Implications for Private Law, Nadjma Yassari and 
Mohr Siebeck (eds.) Max Planck Institute (2005), pp. 23-43. 
4
 Article 43. 
5
 J. Alexander Thier, “The Making of a Constitution in Afghan-
istan”, New York Law School Law Review, vol. 51, 2006/2007, 
pp. 562-563. 
6
 Article 9, Part 6, 1964 constitution. 
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The 1964 constitution lacked the necessary flexibility to 
accommodate the political and economic life of the country 
and thus precipitated the end of the monarchy. Rigidity 
has characterised all subsequent attempts to install a con-
stitutional order, including the most recent. In essence, 
the 2004 constitution was a return to the 1964 blueprint. 
References to the king were removed, but the same author-
itarian institutional structures were kept in place, and the 
weak system of checks and balances remained wholly in-
tact. This all but ensured that the structural flaws that led 
to the disintegration of the state under Zahir Shah in 1973 
would undermine rule of law in post-Taliban Afghanistan. 
The constitutional review process adopted under the aegis 
of the 2001 Bonn Agreement could potentially have cor-
rected some of these flaws. Interference from Washington 
and internecine squabbling among Afghan elites, however, 
torpedoed even modest remedial measures.
7
 The balance 
of power between the three branches of government was 
consequently skewed heavily in favour of a powerful execu-
tive in Kabul, while the reach of government was sharply 
limited in the provinces. The president under the current 
constitution is in effect both king and kingmaker, with 
powers to issue decrees that are next to impossible to chal-
lenge because of barriers to political party formation and 
to coalitions in parliament. In addition to war powers and 
command of the security forces, the president is empowered 
to appoint all high-level ministers and issue legal decrees 
with only narrow legislative input.
8
 The legislature has 
been all but neutered, and uncertainty about the parameters 
of judicial review in the constitution has allowed him to 
operate unchecked. 
Since the 2004 constitution was ratified and the Wolesi 
Jirga was elected in the first post-Taliban elections in 
2005, executive overreach and legislative bickering have 
become increasingly commonplace, while the independ-
ence of the judiciary has been under constant threat. The 
crux of each political crisis has been the lack of constitu-
tional safeguards to ensure separation of powers. As the 
system has struggled to mature, elections have formed the 
basis of the major constitutional battles precisely because 
of these imbalances. While on the surface flaws in the 
electoral process often seem the result of technical or ad-
ministrative failures or the caprice of powerful individual 
actors, they more often reflect the inability of the three 
branches of government to reach consensus on how to 
 
7
 See Crisis Group Report, Afghanistan’s Flawed Constitutional 
Process, op. cit. 
8
 Article 64 of the 2004 constitution enumerates ten separate 
presidential “authorities and duties”, including “determin[ing] 
the fundamental lines of policy of the country with the endorse-
ment of the National Assembly”; Article 76 reinforces this, 
calling for the president to “implement fundamental lines of the 
policy of the country and regulate its duties”.  
share power – and on the structure of the state itself. As 
an experienced international election observer explained 
recently, “in Afghanistan, technical issues very often 
quickly spin off into the political, and usually there is no 
turning back”.9  
Even before the deeply flawed 2009 and 2010 elections, it 
was evident that profound distrust for and dissatisfaction 
with the electoral system, along with institutional rivalries, 
were likely to have a destabilising effect.
10
 Although par-
liamentarians first voted into office in 2005 vigorously 
debated revisions to the laws governing elections, the Wolesi 
Jirga was unable to reach consensus on essential revisions. 
In the absence of a disciplined, structured political party 
system, it could not overcome President Hamid Karzai’s 
concerted campaign to quash perceived threats to the presi-
dential system.
11
  
The president’s wide-ranging power to change the law or 
fill in statutory gaps by decree has deeply impacted the 
legal framework for elections. The electoral law is based 
on several presidential decrees, including a 62-article 
document outlining provisions for conduct of the polls 
issued in 2004.
12
 That decree has long been a matter of 
dispute and debate within parliament, as has a subsequent 
one on elections issued in February 2010, only months 
before the parliamentary polls. Their most contentious 
points pertain to the range and scope of regulatory powers 
of electoral institutions, the appointment of electoral offi-
cials, the processes for dealing with complaints and irreg-
ularities, the format of electoral mechanisms and the preser-
vation of quotas for women and minorities.  
The Independent Elections Commission (IEC), along 
with the Independent Commission for the Supervision of 
Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC) and the Afghan-
istan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), 
is one of three constitutionally-mandated commissions.
13
 
 
9
 Crisis Group telephone interview, 9 August 2012. 
10
 See “Post-Election Strategy Group Progress Report”, Joint 
Election Management Body (JEMB), 27 September 2005; and 
“Elections White Paper. Supporting Feasible, Sustainable and 
Affordable Elections in Afghanistan”, Election Working Group 
paper for the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), 
April 2007. 
11
 In addition to the 2004 constitution, several supplementary 
presidential decrees outline the administration of elections. The 
2009 presidential and provincial council polls were conducted 
primarily under Presidential Decree no. 28 on the 2004 electoral 
law; the 2010 parliamentary elections were conducted under the 
presidential decree issued in February 2010. 
12
 Presidential Decree no. 28 was signed by Karzai on 12 May 
2004 and published on 27 May. 
13
 Article 156 of the 2004 constitution states that: “[t]he Inde-
pendent Election Commission shall be established to administer 
and supervise every kind of elections as well as refer to general 
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Although establishment of the chief electoral body is re-
quired by law, structural specifics were left out of the 
constitution. Since the IEC was created in 2006, it has 
operated primarily under a 2005 presidential decree that 
gives only the vaguest organisational outlines and little 
detail on the mechanics of administration. This lack of a 
clear, substantive structure has been a chief bugbear of the 
electoral process, leaving questions about the extent of its 
authority to be negotiated ad hoc, often as disputes arise 
during the polling process. Several times during the 2009 
and 2010 elections, the IEC tried to act as judge and jury 
in such disputes, raising a spectre of conflict of interest that 
badly damaged its credibility and opened the entire elec-
toral process to deeper conflicts over the Supreme Court’s 
role in determining constitutional authority. 
Compounding these problems is the use of the highly im-
practical Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system 
in multi-seat constituencies. Under this system, each voter 
indicates on the ballot a single favoured candidate. This 
would make sense for an electoral system in which seats 
are allotted for single-member constituencies. However, 
in Afghanistan’s multi-seat constituencies thousands of 
votes are often wasted, while representatives are elected 
in many cases by a slim margin. In the absence of politi-
cal parties, there is little incentive for candidates to work 
together to cultivate voters, since a handful of ballots may 
mean the difference between winning or losing a seat. A 
number of remedies have been suggested, as discussed 
below, but perennial deadlock in parliament over changing 
the system and fierce resistance to reform from the presi-
dent and his allies have thus far left the polling method 
unchanged. 
The impact of these deficiencies might not be so keenly 
felt if flaws in the voter registry were not also rife. The 
system has been flawed since the 2004 presidential election. 
Some twelve million cards were issued to voters in 2003, 
before polling sites were even properly identified. Without 
such identification, each voter could not be allocated to a 
specific polling station, and it was impossible to draw up 
site-specific voter lists from the registry. Despite efforts over 
the last eight years to correct the registry, it still contains 
insufficient information to produce voter lists. Moreover, 
according to UN estimates, nearly seven million surplus voter 
cards are in circulation.
14
 The absence of a national census 
and failed efforts to create a national identification card 
compound these problems.  
 
public opinion of the people in accordance with the provisions 
of the law”. 
14
 “Afghanistan Voter Registration Feasibility Study”, report 
prepared at the request of the Independent Electoral Commission 
of Afghanistan (IEC) under the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) ELECT II support program, August 2012, p. 9. 
Observers of the elections process, including Crisis 
Group, repeatedly warned in 2009 and 2010 that failure to 
implement reforms and address technical flaws would re-
sult in disaster; these calls went largely unheeded.
15
 The 
president and the Supreme Court repeatedly violated the 
constitutional mandate of the IEC and the legislature in 
both elections, intervening in disputes without a mandate 
and directly threatening IEC and ECC leadership when 
disputes were not favourably resolved. Confusion, mean-
while, reigned over the role and responsibilities of the 
IEC’s counterpart, the ECC, and the electoral complaints 
process was mired in controversy.
16
 Both polls ended with 
millions of fraudulent votes tossed out; in the case of the 
September 2010 parliamentary election, prolonged battles 
over the results all but destroyed the credibility not only 
of the IEC but also of the judiciary. Risks are high that 
the 2014 presidential election could result in a similar or 
worse outcome. 
The main battle lines on elections have more or less already 
been drawn. The debate is squarely focused on five key 
areas: the timing of the elections; the roles, responsibili-
ties and structure of electoral institutions; the format of the 
voting mechanism (SNTV versus a mixed proportional 
representation system); the status of the voter registry; and 
the procedures for resolving electoral complaints and dis-
putes. All these issues have generated heated political wran-
gling since 2005. Each has the potential to unravel the entire 
electoral process at the peak of the security transition. There 
are considerable fears that, without strong signals of support 
for reform from the presidential palace, parliament and the 
international community, the same political paralysis that 
prevented reform in the past will rear its head again in 2014.  
 
15
 For an analysis of the security and political situation preced-
ing the 20 August 2009 presidential polls, see Crisis Group Asia 
Report N°171, Afghanistan’s Election Challenges, 4 June 2009; 
and Asia Briefing N°89, Afghanistan: New U.S. Administration, 
New Directions, 13 March 2009. 
16
 For detailed analysis of the electoral complaints process in 
the 2010 parliamentary polls, see Martine van Bijlert, “Untan-
gling Afghanistan’s 2010 Vote: Analysing the electoral data”, 
Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 2011. 
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II. PREPARING THE WAY FOR 2014 
If past is indeed prologue, then the chaotic battle over the 
18 September 2010 parliamentary elections holds im-
portant clues for the challenges Afghanistan faces in the 
2014 polls, as well as in those for parliament in 2015. In 
late October 2010, the IEC announced that it had invali-
dated 1.3 million fraudulent votes, roughly a quarter of 
the estimated 5.6 million votes cast.
17
 The news set off a 
firestorm among Pashtun candidates, many of whom were 
disqualified, and prompted a swift reaction from Presi-
dent Karzai, who feared loss of control over parliament. 
On 24 November, the IEC announced the final results for 
all 34 provinces, except multi-ethnic Ghazni, where re-
sults were bitterly contested after eleven Hazara candi-
dates swept the board. Clashes and protests over the hotly 
disputed results reached their peak in December, when 
Karzai issued a decree calling for the Supreme Court to 
establish a five-member special tribunal to review fraud 
complaints. 
The crisis ended in an untidy compromise, nearly a year 
after the balloting, eight months after Karzai reluctantly 
agreed under pressure to inaugurate the parliament in 
January 2012 and after a highly controversial recount in 
several provinces under orders of the Supreme Court-
appointed special elections tribunal.
18
 On 22 June 2011, 
that tribunal disqualified 62 candidates, provoking sharp 
condemnation from both the legislature and IEC officials, 
who claimed that the decision trampled on the electoral 
commission’s constitutional mandate.19 Within days of the 
announcement, the Wolesi Jirga summoned Attorney 
General Mohammad Ishaq Aloko and acting Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Abdul Salaam Azimi for hearings, but 
both refused to attend. In response, the Wolesi Jirga 
passed a no-confidence vote against six of the nine Su-
preme Court judges on 25 June and called for them to be 
tried by a special constitutional court. A little more than a 
week later, fights erupted in parliament during a heated 
debate over whether to initiate impeachment procedures 
against President Karzai.
20
 
 
17
 Jonathan Burch, “Almost a quarter of votes in Afghan elec-
tion invalid – officials”, Reuters, 20 October 2010. 
18
 For a comprehensive analysis of the 2010 parliamentary elec-
tions, see Crisis Group Briefing, Afghanistan’s Elections Stale-
mate, op. cit. 
19
 “Kabul court throws out quarter of parliamentary election 
results”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 23 June 2011. 
20
 “Supreme Court strikes back at parliament”, Pajhwok Afghan 
News Service, 27 June 2011. Alissa J. Rubin and Sangar Rahimi, 
“Brawl erupts during impeachment talks in Afghan parliament”, 
The New York Times, 5 July 2011. 
A deal was eventually struck; the IEC, under intense politi-
cal pressure, disqualified nine of the 62 candidates named 
by the special tribunal in August 2011.
21
 The bargain ap-
peared to bring the electoral crisis to a close for the time 
being, but much damage had been done. Unless new elec-
toral laws are adopted and institutional rivalries resolved, 
it seems likely that the political system will experience a 
similar or worse meltdown in 2014. With nearly two years 
to go before the presidential election is constitutionally 
mandated to be held, time – for the moment – is on the 
side of reform.  
A confluence of factors in early 2013, however, could 
trigger a paradigm shift that would make another failed 
election inevitable. There are already signs that changes 
to the electoral framework could become bogged down in 
protracted procedural battles between the upper and lower 
houses of parliament and a standoff between the president 
and opposition members in both chambers. It is critical 
that all three branches of the government make an effort 
to work together to reach a compromise on the timetable 
and procedure for elections. The international community 
must likewise strike a careful balance between maintain-
ing its aid commitments in support of the polls and lever-
aging assistance to ensure that key benchmarks for reform 
are met. Above all, the next eighteen months must be 
used to revise areas of the law that will impact the elec-
tions and restore credibility to key institutions such as the 
IEC, ECC, the Supreme Court and the constitutional 
commission. 
A. TIMING IS EVERYTHING 
Its reputation badly damaged by its handling of the 2009 
and 2010 polls, the IEC initiated internal discussions on 
electoral reform shortly after the crisis triggered by the 
disastrous parliamentary elections was nominally defused 
in August 2011. Conscious that the dual debacle of the 
presidential and parliamentary polls had raised serious 
questions about the commission’s credibility, its leaders 
acknowledged they were “in a sensitive situation” that 
obliged them to both fulfil the commission’s constitutional 
mandate and navigate “a seemingly intractable political 
 
21
 The nine disqualified candidates and their replacements by 
province are 1) Badakhshan: disqualified candidate Abdul Wali 
Niazi, replaced by Abdu Rauf; 2) Baghlan: Mohammad Zahir 
Ghani, by Ashaqullah Wafa; 3) Faryab: Shakir Kargar, by Gul 
Mohammad Pahlawan; 4) Helmand: Massoud Noorzai, by 
Muallem Mirwali; 5) Herat: Samin Barakzai, by Rahima Jami; 
6) Herat: Rafiq Shaheer, by Nesar Ahmad Ghoryani; 7) Paktia: 
Abdul Qadir, by Mahmoud Khan Salim Khel; 8) Samangan: 
Mohammad Tahir Zahir, by Ahmad Khan Samangani (Saman-
gani was killed along with several others in a bomb attack in 
Samangan in July 2012; his seat is still vacant); 9) Zabul: 
Habibullah Andiwal, by Hamidullah Tokhi.  
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impasse”.22 The commission established a working group 
of commissioners and select senior staff from its secretariat 
to draft a revised electoral law and a law on the structure of 
electoral institutions, as well as to outline a strategic vision 
for the IEC itself.
23
  
The strategic vision identified several goals as critical to 
increasing the institution’s credibility and regaining the 
trust of the Afghan people, including increased participa-
tion in the elections process, wider consultation with 
stakeholders and reduction of electoral expenses.
24
 With 
these and other objectives in mind, further consultations 
on proposed amendments to the draft electoral law and 
the long-pending draft law on the structure of the IEC 
were held with civil society election observer groups. 
One-day conferences were also held at the regional level 
in six of the larger provinces, including Kabul, Nangarhar 
and Balkh. Though no attempt was reported to conduct 
similar consultations at the local level in southern or 
western provinces, where large numbers of Pashtuns live, 
the effort was an encouraging first step toward dispelling 
the dark cloud that had hovered over the elections com-
mission in the two years that followed the ill-fated 2009 
presidential polls. 
Wider public debate over the electoral system began in 
earnest in April 2012, after Karzai suggested during a press 
conference with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen 
that the presidential poll be held in 2013, rather than 2014 
as the constitution mandates. He cited concerns that NATO’s 
2014 withdrawal would leave the country vulnerable to 
security threats ahead of the transfer of political power. 
Although a decision of this magnitude would deeply im-
pact NATO withdrawal plans, Rasmussen kept silent. The 
suggestion set off a frenzy of speculation in Kabul and 
prompted a sharp response from critics, who suggested it 
was a pre-emptive ploy to gain an advantage for Karzai’s 
preferred successor, or perhaps even to clear the way for 
him to stand again. Karzai indicated in August he would 
not seek re-election and was searching for a successor.
25
 
Rumours and scattered news reports suggest he may seek 
to support his brother, Qayum,
26
 an ex-member of parlia-
 
22
 “Strategic Plan of the Independent Election Commission of 
Afghanistan: 2011-2016”, IEC, released on 21 April 2012, p. 32. 
23
 “On Completion of the Electoral Law Draft”, IEC secretariat 
press release, 19 June 2012. 
24
 “Strategic Plan of the Independent Election Commission of 
Afghanistan”, op. cit., p. 36. 
25
 Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections and 
Government Performance”, Congressional Research Service, 5 
June 2012, p. 37. 
26
 “Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General An-
ders Fogh Rasmussen and Afghan President Hamid Karzai in 
Kabul Afghanistan”, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions 
_85884.htm. Dion Nissenbaum, “Karzai considers early vote, 
before foreign forces leave”, The Wall Street Journal, 12 April 
ment and adviser to the president on such critical issues 
as reconciliation with the Taliban, who has made no an-
nouncement and demurred when asked about his decision.
27
 
A little more than a week later, on 21 April, the IEC re-
sponded with a pre-emptive strike of its own: Chairman 
Fazl Ahmad Manawi unveiled the commission’s five-year 
strategic plan for an overhaul of the system and intro-
duced the newly revised draft electoral law it planned to 
submit to the justice ministry.
28
 Manawi subtly though 
sharply replied to Karzai’s proposal at a day-long public 
conference at Kabul University, saying the commission 
“will assert its independence based on the law” and “rely 
on the constitution to fix the term of the elections”.29 This 
and other statements by Manawi indicate that battle lines 
are already being drawn, and the debate over the timing 
of the elections may well figure prominently in a prospec-
tive next constitutional crisis. 
Under the constitution, the presidential election should be 
held 30 to 60 days before Karzai’s mandate ends on 22 
May 2014, meaning between 22 March and 22 April.
30
 
The constitution requires provincial council elections to 
be held every four years, which means they should be in 
2013, but IEC officials have indicated that the commission 
has decided to postpone them, due to financial and security 
concerns, and hold them simultaneously with the presi-
dential election in 2014.
31
 To ensure broad participation, 
 
2012. James Risen, “Intrigue in Karzai family as an Afghan era 
closes”, The New York Times, 3 June 2012. 
27
 Richard Gorelick, “‘I’m not mulling,’ says Qayum Karzai”, 
The Baltimore Sun, 4 June 2012. 
28
 “Strategic Plan of the Independent Election Commission of 
Afghanistan”, op. cit. 
29
 Manawi made his comments during a lengthy question and 
answer session at the end of the conference; Crisis Group was 
one of several non-governmental organisations the IEC invited 
to attend the conference. 
30
 Article 61 of the 2004 constitution states that the “[P]resident 
shall be elected by receiving more than fifty per cent of votes 
cast by voters through free, general, secret and direct voting. 
The presidential term shall expire on 1st of Jawza (22 May) of 
the fifth year after elections. Elections shall be held within thirty 
to sixty days prior to the end of the presidential term. If in the 
first round none of the candidates gets more than fifty per cent 
of the votes, elections for the second round shall be held within 
two weeks from the date election results are proclaimed, and, in 
this round only the two candidates who have received the highest 
number of votes in the first round shall participate. In case one 
of the presidential candidates dies during the first or second 
round of voting or after elections, but prior to the declaration of 
results, re-election shall be held according to the provisions of 
the law”. 
31
 IEC officials have been publicly circumspect about plans for 
the provincial council elections; no official announcement has 
yet been made about their postponement. In telephone inter-
views with Crisis Group on 26 September 2012, a senior IEC 
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logistical preparations – from distribution of voter identifi-
cation cards and voter education programs to the placement 
and security for polling centres, distribution of ballots and 
ballot protection procedures – would have to take place in 
the winter, when whole swathes of the country are likely 
to be inaccessible due to weather, and be completed by 
February 2014. IEC officials and international election 
observers insist the timetable can be maintained; experi-
ence, however, indicates that this is at best optimistic.
32
  
Six months before the 2009 presidential election, the IEC 
announced that it would be conducted in August, that is 
five months after Karzai’s constitutional mandate was of-
ficially scheduled to expire. Citing “harsh weather” as the 
main reason, it also stated that security conditions during 
the spring, the traditional start of the fighting season, 
would be an impediment. The decision provoked consid-
erable rancour in parliament, including from Mohammad 
Younus Qanooni, then speaker of the lower house and a 
leading Northern Alliance opposition figure, who com-
plained that it was a veiled attempt by Karzai to extend his 
grip on power.
33
 The president quashed the debate by re-
ferring the issue to the Supreme Court, which ruled that he 
could continue in office a little more than seven months 
beyond the legal expiration of his term.34 A similar scenario 
is well within the realm of possibility, and it is as likely 
that it would provoke a violent response from aggrieved 
presidential contenders or their supporters. 
As yet, no official date has been announced for the presi-
dential poll, and there has been virtually no discussion of 
plans for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2015. 
The delay in setting a date has huge implications, not only 
logistically but also for the constitutionally-mandated trans-
fer of power at the end of Karzai’s final term. According 
to the constitution, the president, first-vice president and 
second-vice president are allowed to serve no more than 
two five-year terms.
35
 Karzai, therefore, should leave office 
when his term ends in May 2014.  
 
official indicated that they would be held in 2014, and a former 
senior government official said that IEC officials decided in 
July 2012 on postponement due to concerns about security and 
the financial impact of holding successive polls in 2013, 2014 
and 2015. IEC officials have indicated discussion on the issue 
is ongoing. 
32
 Crisis Group interviews, senior IEC official, Kabul, 17 July 
2012; (phone), international elections expert, 14 August 2012. 
33
 “Statement of the Independent Election Commission regarding 
the determination of the date for holding the presidential and 
provincial council elections”, IEC, 4 March 2009. 
34
 Salahuddin Loudazai, “Wolesi Jirga speaker: There was an 
occult hand behind the Supreme Court decision”, Pajhwok Afghan 
News, 28 April 2012. 
35
 2004 constitution, Article 62. 
The 2004 constitution, however, contains loopholes that 
could allow the president to keep power longer. The strong-
est option for extension of his term is a state of emergency. 
Chapter nine sets out the conditions.
36
 Article 143 em-
powers the president to declare a state of emergency “[i]f 
because of war, threat of war, serious rebellion, natural 
disasters or similar conditions, protection of independence 
and national life become impossible”. Several articles 
would be suspended, leading to martial law; the govern-
ment would also have the right to “inspect personal corre-
spondence and communications”.37 Article 145 further 
empowers the president to “transfer some of the powers 
of the National Assembly to the government [executive]” 
in consultation with the presidents of the National Assembly 
as well as the chief justice. This article neither stipulates 
which powers may be transferred nor what constitutes 
sufficient consultation with the designated members of 
the parliament and Supreme Court.  
Article 147 states that “if the presidential term or the leg-
islative term of the National Assembly expires during the 
state of emergency, the new general elections shall be 
postponed, and the presidential as well as parliamentary 
terms shall extend up to four months”. Should the state of 
emergency extend beyond four months, the president is 
empowered to call a Loya Jirga.
38
 And therein lies one of 
several problems with the state of emergency provisions 
Although the primary requirements for convening a Loya 
Jirga provide for it to consist of the National Assembly, 
presidents of district assemblies, the attorney general and 
members of the Supreme Court, no express role is stipu-
lated for the president.
39
 
If President Karzai declares a state of emergency ahead of 
or during the 2014 election campaign, there would be 
very high risks of major violence.40 It could also bring to 
the surface the factionalism long latent in the Afghan na-
tional security forces (ANSF) and possibly trigger the 
break-up of parts of the army, police and intelligence ser-
vices. Martial law would place a tremendous burden on 
not only Afghan security forces but also ISAF, precisely 
as the NATO withdrawal was developing. Karzai himself 
 
36
 Ibid, Articles 143-148. 
37
 Article 145 provides for full suspension of Articles 27 and 36, 
as well as the second clause of Article 37, on protection against 
government surveillance of communications and correspondence. 
38
 The final clause of Article 147 states: “Within two months 
after the termination of the state of emergency, elections shall 
be held”. 
39
 Articles 110-115 describe conditions and requirements for 
convening a Loya Jirga. 
40
 On 4 October, President Karzai told a press conference in 
Kabul that the presidential election “will definitely happen” and 
“without interruption”. He added: “Go on and choose your own 
favourite candidate. My term, if prolonged by even a day, will 
be seen as illegitimate”. Reuters, 4 October 2012. 
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has indicated concerns about security ahead of elections, 
and no doubt this is very much on the minds of ISAF 
leadership as well as officers in the defence and interior 
ministries. But in Afghanistan foreseeing danger does not 
always mean preventing it. An official announcement on 
the date and timetable for presidential polls before the 
end of 2012 could do much to avert this worst-case sce-
nario.
41
 Karzai critics have publicly voiced fears of just 
such a scenario, most notably his long-time political rival, 
Mohammad Younus Qanooni: 
Our view is that the president does not want to hold 
the election early; rather he wants to delay the elec-
tion. This is a political game and a political trick so 
that he can call a Loya Jirga, 80 of whose members 
are in his circle of cronies. The Jirga could decide that 
he should remain president until the security situation 
returns to normal. … If the president makes this mis-
take, the people will take to the streets, and the Arab 
Spring will be replicated here.
42
 
On the logistical side, determining a date well in advance 
would aid in assuring a smooth transition at the IEC. 
Chairman Manawi’s term expires in April 2013.43 As yet, 
there is no clear shortlist of candidates, and even if one or 
two candidates do emerge, it is not at all certain that 
Manawi’s successor would accede to the chairmanship 
without lengthy consultations between the president and 
powerbrokers in his inner circle such as First-Vice Presi-
dent Mohammad Qasim Fahim and others. In addition to 
clearing the path for top IEC appointments, setting a date 
for the election and timetables for the overall process be-
fore the end of 2012 would allow ample time to clean up 
the voter registry, hire and train IEC staff, conduct voter 
and candidate education and set the parameters for han-
dling electoral complaints.  
Determining a date sooner rather than later would also 
reduce the possibility of protracted wrangling pushing the 
debate over the electoral calendar into the courts and/or a 
prolonged legal battle over an extension of Karzai’s term. 
The 2010 experience shows that such a scenario, dis-
cussed further below, could easily set off a battle between 
the Supreme Court and the ICSIC. In times of crisis, 
when his grip on power appears threatened or he needs to 
gain leverage, Karzai has outsourced controversial deci-
sions to the high court and the commission, casting a long 
shadow over the credibility of both. Without clarity on the 
 
41
 Mujib Mashal, “The question of succession”, Afghanistan 
Analysts Network, 18 May 2012. 
42
 Crisis Group interview, Mohammad Younus Qanooni, member 
of parliament (Kabul) and former speaker of the lower house, 
Kabul, 18 April 2012. 
43
 Crisis Group interviews, senior Afghan officials, Kabul, April 
and July 2012. 
electoral calendar, it is quite conceivable that legal skir-
mishes between the two institutions could combine with 
deteriorating security conditions to prevent the elections 
from happening at all.  
On a positive note, with the possible exception of Karzai 
himself, stakeholders on all sides appear to recognise the 
imperative of setting the electoral schedule as soon as 
possible. Opposition groups have made this a centrepiece 
of their electoral reform demands. In a rare if coincidental 
show of unity, several leaders of newly formed political 
factions, such as the National Front of Afghanistan, the 
National Coalition of Afghanistan and the Right and Jus-
tice Party, have all called for the IEC to announce a date 
before the end of 2012.
44
 
The international community signalled its concern about 
the lack of clarity on the electoral calendar at the July 
2012 Tokyo Conference, calling on the government to 
hold “credible, inclusive and transparent presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015 according to the 
Afghan Constitution” and to “develop, by early 2013, a 
comprehensive election timeline through 2015 for elec-
toral preparations and polling dates”.45 This laudable goal 
is only likely to be achieved if donors aggressively lever-
age what is said to be their unwritten pledge to withhold 
future funding if the government fails to meet these and 
other basic benchmarks agreed in Japan.
46
 The Tokyo Dec-
laration is, nonetheless, vague in many areas and leaves 
the president far too much room to manoeuvre on elec-
toral reform, omitting for instance a more specific target 
date for replacing outgoing IEC Chairman Manawi.  
Several Western and Afghan officials have suggested the 
government and donors reached specific understandings 
in Tokyo pertaining to long pending draft laws, including 
 
44
 The Right and Justice Party (Hizb-e Haq wa Edelaat), 
launched in November 2011, claims multi-ethnic membership. 
Former Interior Minister Hanif Atmar, AIHRC chairwoman 
Sima Samar and Rangin Dadfar Spanta, head of the National 
Security Council, are its best-known supporters. The National 
Coalition of Afghanistan (Etelaf-e Milli-ye Afghanistan) was 
formed in December 2011 under leadership of Dr Abdullah 
Abdullah, ex-foreign minister and presidential candidate. Both 
are considered left of centre. The National Front of Afghanistan 
(Jebhaye Mili-ye Afghanistan), supported by non-Pashtun fac-
tional leaders such as Abdul Rashid Dostum and Mohammad 
Mohaqqeq, represents a much more stridently anti-Taliban loy-
al opposition faction. The National Coalition of Afghanistan 
issued a draft white paper, “Improving the Electoral Process of 
Afghanistan”, in January 2012 calling for the July Tokyo Con-
ference to announce an electoral timetable.  
45
 “The Tokyo Declaration, Partnership for Self-Reliance in 
Afghanistan: From Transition to Transformation”, 8 July 2012. 
46
 Crisis Group interviews, senior international and Afghan of-
ficials, Kabul, 12-21 July 2012. 
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the electoral law, and overdue government appointments. 
Failure to name a new Supreme Court chief justice who 
enjoys support from across the political spectrum and to 
fill other openings on the high court by the end of 2012 
would be one of several triggers for withholding aid.
47
 
Since these understandings were never made public, there 
is no way to assess the credibility of the assertions. Early 
indications suggest, however, that donors are only just 
beginning to engage on elections; there appears to be little 
consensus among the U.S. and other leading donors on 
the exact timing for the presidential poll, or how best to 
leverage benchmarks set at Tokyo.
48
 They must coordinate 
better on the elections agenda in the coming eighteen 
months and should be especially wary of the temptation 
to allow the military drawdown to dictate the pace and 
shape of the presidential and parliamentary polls. 
On 26 July, Karzai, in an effort both to signal sincerity to 
donors after Tokyo and exert control over the reform 
agenda, issued a presidential decree outlining an electoral 
timetable of sorts. Its 164 articles touch on a number of 
corruption-related issues mentioned in the conference 
declaration but also direct the IEC to “prepare the plan for 
registering [candidates’] names for presidential elections 
… and present it to the [presidential] Cabinet within a 
month”.49 The decree further calls for the IEC to “create a 
comprehensive schedule for presidential, parliamentary 
and provincial council elections within three months”, 
that is by late October.  
Given that the decree was quietly released by the presi-
dent’s office late on a weekend day in the middle of 
Ramadan, the holy month of Muslim prayer and fasting, 
it immediately met criticism in the parliament. It does not 
seem likely that the order to set the electoral timetable 
will be heeded on time or executed.
50
 Deliberations on 
changes to the newly revised draft electoral law were still 
underway in September 2012, and the justice ministry 
had yet to pass the draft to the cabinet for further review. 
The lower house of parliament passed a revised version 
of the law on the structure and mandate of the IEC and 
the ECC on 25 September; it now awaits review by the 
upper house. It appears likely, however, that the omnibus 
bill will be bogged down in haggling between the two 
chambers for several more weeks, if not months, and even 
more likely that the president would veto it in its current 
 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Crisis Group interview, international official, Kabul, 12 July 
2012. 
49
 Presidential Decree no. 45 of 5 Asad 1391 (26 July 2012), 
“On the Execution of Content of the Historical Speech of 1 Sa-
ratan 1391 [21 June 2012] in the Special Session of National 
Assembly”, released on 27 July. 
50
 Abasin Zaheer, “Karzai’s decree a move toward dictatorship: 
MPs”, Pajhwok Afghan News Service, 28 July 2012. 
form.
51
 There is no time to waste. Electoral planning de-
mands a definitive schedule, implementing the law and 
pushing the process forward in stages depends heavily on 
fixing the polling date.
52
 
B. REVISING THE LAW AND RESTORING 
CREDIBILITY 
1. The Electoral Law 
In June 2012, the IEC announced that it had submitted a 
revised version of the draft electoral law to the justice 
ministry’s legislative review department (the taqnin). This 
contains a number of improvements and important clari-
fications in areas not touched on in previous decrees. But 
it would also introduce flaws that could prove fatal for 
efforts to reform the system before the 2014 election. The 
three most controversial elements are introduction of an 
electoral system combining proportional representation 
with SNTV; preservation of reserved seats for nomadic 
tribal groups (kuchis); and changes to the composition of 
the Electoral Complaints Commission.  
Although it is likely the draft electoral legislation will 
undergo many significant changes as it passes through the 
system, from the council of ministers to the parliament 
and back to the president for signature, it is important to 
recognise the challenges. In the absence of an active politi-
cal party system in the National Assembly, negotiations 
over electoral reforms are likely to stall repeatedly. The 
parliament will need to make a concerted effort to arrive 
at a compromise on the most controversial elements. If it is 
to ensure fair and transparent administration of the elec-
tions, it is highly desirable that the law be passed at least 
one year before the end of the president’s term, that is no 
later than May 2013, to allow for changes to be fully im-
plemented well ahead of the polls.  
Disagreements over the move to a mixed system are likely 
to prove the biggest obstacle. On its surface, SNTV appears 
simple: one voter, one vote, one successful candidate. In 
many single-seat or first-past-the-post constituencies such 
as those in “Westminster”-based systems, each voter casts 
a ballot for a single candidate. However, distortions arise 
in multi-seat constituencies such as those for Afghani-
stan’s parliamentary, provincial council and district council 
elections. If a large proportion of citizens vote for one 
 
51
 Crisis Group interview, Mohammad Abdoh, chairman of the 
Wolesi Jirga justice committee, Kabul, 25 September 2012. 
52
 For more on scheduling and other challenges, see Martin Hess, 
Therese Pearce Laanela and William Maley, “Preparing for 
Elections in Afghanistan: Prospects and Challenges”, Summary 
Report, Australian National University, ANU College of Asia 
and the Pacific/Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Canberra, 
17-18 March 2012. 
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candidate, this numerous group will elect a single repre-
sentative, while a much smaller number of voters will 
disproportionately elect their favoured candidates.
53
 In 
Afghanistan, multi-member constituencies result in the 
election of representatives with wildly varying mandates; 
seats can be won in large provinces with small numbers 
and small margins. This sharply limits the incentives for 
candidates to cooperate and makes it easy to miscalculate 
the votes two or more allied candidates need to both win 
seats.
54
 
The version of the electoral law submitted for review by 
the IEC in June 2012 proposes to remedy this by intro-
ducing a mixed system in which voters would vote for 80 
of the 249-seats allocated for the Wolesi Jirga under a 
proportional representation system with party candidates. 
They would still, however, use SNTV to determine 159 
lower house seats, which would be allocated for inde-
pendent candidates.
55
 With ten seats of the 249 seats re-
served for kuchis and 68 seats overall allocated for women, 
however, this formula raises questions about the value of 
such proportional seat allocations.
56
  
Analysts have further argued that the number of seats al-
located for party candidates under this arrangement would 
be too low; party candidates in more than a third of prov-
inces would compete for a single seat.
57
 The draft law is 
likewise unclear how a ballot for this mixed system 
would be designed. Moreover, given the IEC’s poor per-
formance in promoting voter education in the past, it 
seems highly unlikely that it would have the resources to 
ensure that voters would understand these changes. Some 
civil society organisations, including the Free and Fair 
Elections Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA), the country’s 
 
53
 Crisis Group Asia Report N°101, Afghanistan Elections: 
Endgame or New Beginning, 21 July 2005, p. 10. 
54
 For detailed analysis on proposed alternatives to the current 
SNTV system, see Andrew Reynolds and John Carey, “Fixing 
Afghanistan’s Electoral System: Arguments and Options for 
Reform”, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 
July 2012. The breakdown and discussion of seat allocations 
can be found on pp. 18-20. 
55
 Chapter 5 of the 2012 Draft Electoral Law describes seat al-
locations in detail. 
56
 Article 83 of the 2004 constitution states: “…The number of 
the members of the House of People shall be proportionate to 
the population of each constituency, not exceeding the maxi-
mum of two hundred fifty individuals. Electoral constituencies 
as well as other related issues shall be determined by the elections 
law. The elections law shall adopt measures to attain, through 
the electorate system, general and fair representation for all the 
people of the country, and proportionate to the population of 
every province, on average, at least two females shall be the 
elected members of the House of People from each province”. 
57
 Reynolds and Carey, op. cit., p. 20. 
largest and perhaps most influential election observation 
group, have, nonetheless, endorsed the draft.
58
 
Arguments have been made for alternatives to the mixed 
system described in the pending legislation. One suggested 
by analysts at the Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit 
(AREU), a Kabul-based independent research organisa-
tion, calls for a Limited Vote and Proportional Representa-
tion (LV-PR) system.
59
 In such a system, a voter casts fewer 
votes than there are seats to be elected, thus guaranteeing 
that majority groups can win more than half the seats but 
not necessarily all.
60
 Instead of being limited to selecting 
a single candidate, a voter would be allowed to choose 
two on the ballot. Seats allocated by party under a propor-
tional system would also be distributed across all 34 
provinces, which would ostensibly solve the problem of 
limited proportionality, encourage candidate alliances and 
address concerns raised during the 2010 polls about the 
distribution of the vote across ethnic groups in especially 
diverse provinces such as Ghazni.
61
  
The alternative procedures may indeed offer a way to re-
solve the conundrum of replacing SNTV with a mixed 
system, but a great deal of work would be needed to educate 
Afghan political leaders and voters about the implications. 
Without vigorous, unqualified support from the interna-
tional community, any attempt to integrate such changes 
would likely meet strong resistance from Karzai and his 
allies. The president has consistently resisted attempts to 
move toward proportional representation, and he and other 
political heavyweights have actively blocked the devel-
opment of parties.
62
 To overcome these obstacles, donors 
will need to invest heavily in programs to familiarise par-
liamentarians and government officials with the technical 
aspects of different voting mechanisms and their political 
ramifications. Without significant international funding and 
expenditure of political capital, there is a risk that changes 
to the system – even in draft form – could reinforce grow-
ing ethnic tensions between non-Pashtuns and Pashtuns, 
the dominant ethnic group.  
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 Reynolds and Carey, op. cit., p. 21. 
60
 For a comparative analysis of electoral systems, see Robert 
G. Moser and Ethan Scheiner, “Mixed Electoral Systems and 
Electoral System Effects: Controlled Comparison and Cross-
National Analysis”, Electoral Studies 23 (2004), pp. 575-599; 
Pippa Norris, “ Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian 
and Mixed Systems”, International Political Science Review, 
vol. 18, no. 3, 1997, pp. 297-312. 
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 Reynolds and Carey, op. cit., p. 22. On 18 September 2010, 
nearly half the 272 polling centres in Ghazni were closed due to 
insecurity, many in predominantly Pashtun areas.  
62
 On political party development, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing 
N°39, Political Parties in Afghanistan, 5 June 2005. 
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This was illustrated sharply in September 2010 in Ghazni, 
when the large-scale closure of polling centres and divisions 
among Pashtun candidates resulted in Hazara candidates 
taking all eleven allocated seats.
63
 The subsequent standoff 
over the results exacerbated longstanding tensions between 
Hazaras and Pashtuns in the province and in parliament. 
Only two years earlier, Hazara members of parliament 
had staged a walkout over a provision in the electoral law 
for the allocation of ten seats in the lower house to the 
primarily Pashtun kuchis. Given these tensions, it is likely 
that the provisions for kuchi seat allocations, which have 
been retained in Article 19 of the 2012 version of the 
draft electoral law, will again be a deal-breaker. 
2. IEC and ECC 
The 2004 constitution designates the IEC as the primary 
institution responsible for administering and supervising 
elections.
64
 Its role and organisation were further elabo-
rated in two presidential decrees separately issued in 2004 
and 2005.
65
 Other than outlining the educational criteria 
and age requirements and prohibiting persons with criminal 
backgrounds from serving on it, however, the 2005 edict 
is vague about structure, not even stipulating, for example, 
the number of members.
66
 Article 2 calls for the chairman 
and vice chairman to serve three-year terms and for the 
commission to appoint other staff but does not explain how. 
The commission was, nonetheless, officially constituted 
in 2006 on the basis of these decrees. In November 2007, 
its officials tried to fill gaps in the legal framework by 
drafting a law on its basic structure, duties and mandate.
67
 
After considerable debate, a joint committee was formed 
in 2008 by the Wolesi Jirga and Meshrano Jirga, and the 
bill was passed and sent to the president for signature in 
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 Events in Ghazni during and after the 2010 parliamentary 
elections have been analysed from a number of angles by various 
observers and scholars. See, for instance, Thomas Ruttig, 
“Ghazni’s election drama: it’s the system”, Foreign Policy 
(online), 2 December 2010; Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, 
“Undermining Representative Governance: Afghanistan’s 2010 
Parliamentary Election and Its Alienating Impact”, AREU, 
February 2011; Emily Winterbotham, “Legacies of Conflict: 
Healing Complexes and Moving Forwards in Ghazni Province”, 
AREU, October 2011. 
64
 Article 156: “The Independent Election Commission shall be 
established to administer and supervise every kind of election 
… as well as refer to general public opinion of the people in 
accordance with the provisions of the law”. 
65
 The composition and role of the IEC in administering elec-
tions are outlined in Presidential Decree no. 28 (chapter two), 
on the 2004 electoral law; structure and procedures are further 
elaborated in Presidential Decree no. 23, 24 January 2005. 
66
 Presidential Decree no. 23, Article 3. 
67
 Afghanistan Parliament Legislative Tracking Service, www. 
legtrack.af/scr/BLS/BLS.aspx?Type=SP:82. 
February 2009. Karzai rejected it the next month and re-
turned it to parliament, arguing that a provision for parlia-
mentary approval of presidentially-appointed IEC officers 
was not specified in the constitution, so would illegally 
abrogate the president’s authority.  
Debate on the legislation has focused primarily on the 
process for appointments to the commission and its basic 
composition. Karzai appointed the last two chairs on the 
basis of two legal mechanisms: a constitutional provision 
that allows an interim government to both establish the 
IEC and appoint its members;
68
 and presidential decrees 
that parliament has yet to nullify. The constitution is silent 
on whether the president is required to seek the approval of 
the lower house for IEC appointments. To confuse matters 
further, there is no specific mention of a requirement to 
seek lower house approval in the constitution’s rather im-
precise reference to the “appointment of other high-ranking 
officials” under enumerated presidential powers.69  
A loose reading of these stipulations might just be stretched 
to give the president the sole authority to appoint the chair 
and deputy chair of the commission, but such an interpre-
tation would undermine the intent of checks and balances 
contained in the constitution. Legislative input on IEC 
appointments would be an important step toward restor-
ing the balance of power between the executive and the 
legislature. It is conceivable that adjustments to electoral 
laws could be made to allow for broader institutional con-
sultation on IEC appointments, but this would be only an 
interim measure, with few guarantees that disputes arising 
out of the appointment process could be timely resolved by 
judicial review. To protect the IEC’s independence, any 
changes to the appointment process – a central part of the 
constitutional checks and balances – would necessarily 
require an amendment to the constitution. The requirements 
for the adoption of a constitutional amendment are too 
arduous under the current scheme and political barriers too 
numerous, however, to make this possible in the near term.  
In view of these concerns, civil society organisations have 
suggested several paths to devising a selection process for 
commissioners. Notably, FEFA has proposed a nine-member 
commission instead of the seven in the 2009 draft law; 
the aim would be to achieve greater balance. It has also 
suggested lengthening terms from three years to six and 
called for the commission to elect its chair and vice chair 
itself, by a direct, secret ballot. Under FEFA’s proposal, 
commissioners would be selected from among 27 nomi-
nees culled from a list of select civil society actors, scholars, 
scientists and university teachers.
70
 A selection committee 
 
68
 Article 159, Parts 1 and 3. 
69
 2004 constitution, Article 64, Part 13. 
70
 “Proposal to amend the structure, duties and authorities law 
of the Independent Election Commission”, FEFA, 26 March 2012. 
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composed of the speakers of the two houses of parliament, 
the ICSIC and AIHRC chairs, the attorney general, the di-
rector of the gender department and the chair of the High 
Office of Oversight (the anti-corruption agency) would 
winnow the candidates from 27 to eighteen.
71
 The president 
would then appoint the nine commissioners for six-year 
terms from that list of eighteen finalists forwarded by the 
selection committee.  
On 25 September 2012, the Wolesi Jirga passed a modified 
version of this amendment to the law in an omnibus bill 
that outlines the structure and mandate of the IEC and ECC. 
The bill called for the academic councils of state-subsidised 
universities to select twelve candidates and for private post-
secondary education institutions to do likewise. An addi-
tional three candidates would be selected by undesignated 
civil society organisations. A multi-stage nomination and 
appointment process would follow, with fourteen nominees 
forwarded to the president by a selection committee com-
posed of the Supreme Court chief justice, the chair of the 
ICSIC, the upper and lower house speakers and leaders of 
registered political parties. The president would ultimately 
appoint nine commissioners from this list for six-year terms, 
including at least two women. The chair, deputy chair and 
secretary would be elected by a secret direct ballot of com-
mission members and would serve three-year terms.
72
  
The omnibus bill additionally proposes to establish the ECC 
as a permanent body. Three candidates would be nominated 
for a list of fifteen by the Supreme Court, two by the attor-
ney general’s office, three by the Wolesi Jirga, two by the 
Meshrano Jirga, two by the AIHRC, two by the national 
bar association and one by unspecified electoral observer 
groups. The president would subsequently appoint five com-
mission members from this list of fifteen. The draft does 
not describe a specific timetable for this process or offer 
alternate procedures in the event of disputes or deadlock. 
Perhaps most controversially, its Article 33 also calls for the 
UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) to in-
troduce two foreign elections experts to the complaints 
commission on a temporary basis but does not specify how 
their votes would be weighted. Given the controversy over 
the appointment of foreign nationals to the ECC ahead of 
the 2010 elections, the reintroduction of this provision is 
likely to fuel clashes between the president and parliament 
again. 
The merit of these proposals is debatable, but they appear 
to be an attempt to strike a balance between executive 
privilege and broad consultation in the IEC appointment 
 
71
 A Supreme Court representative is notably absent from the 
proposed membership. 
72
 Article 5, draft law on the structure, mandate and duties of the 
IEC and ECC, introduced in the Wolesi Jirga on 17 September 
2012. 
process. Longer terms and an internal election process 
would also safeguard the independence of the institution 
and ensure greater continuity. But the proposals on offer, 
inside and outside of parliament, are shot through with 
inconsistencies, riddled with vagaries and far too convo-
luted to pass legal muster, let alone pass through the de-
cidedly more conservative upper house that has a presi-
dentially-appointed majority and must approve legislation 
before it is sent to Karzai for signature. Moreover, the in-
troduction of greater complexity to the process is likely to 
hasten the already outsized entropy extant in the political 
system.  
There is a high probability that the draft omnibus law on 
IEC and ECC structure will bog down in squabbling be-
tween the Meshrano Jirga and Wolesi Jirga and will 
moulder for several months in a joint commission of the 
two chambers. Even on the off chance that legislative con-
sensus is reached, it is a near certainty that Karzai would 
reject any version that appeared to curtail his appointment 
powers. Parliament could conceivably override a presiden-
tial veto with a two-thirds majority vote in the lower house, 
but this too seems unrealistic.  
It is highly unlikely that the parliament would even be 
able to achieve the necessary quorum to override a presiden-
tial veto. Lack of a quorum has been a perennial problem 
since its inception. Many members abstain from voting, 
and equally as many simply do not show up. Furthermore, 
without a political party system and clear parliamentary 
procedural rules, it would be tremendously difficult for 
the lower house to alter a law rejected by the president. In 
particularly high-stakes votes, promises of patronage and 
pay-offs, backed by not a little intimidation, have also 
proved a strong disincentive for legislators who might be 
looking to break from the pack and undercut presidential 
authority. Parliamentary leaders should work toward a 
compromise with the president on the IEC and ECC selec-
tion process, steering clear of overreaching the legislature’s 
mandate. The overall goal of any legislation and deals bro-
kered on the structure and mandate of electoral institutions 
must be to strengthen independence, ensure transparency 
and restore credibility to the polling process. 
Reforms are necessary, but the consequences of each must 
be carefully considered, along with the likely prospect that 
changes of any kind will probably produce a backlash from 
several different stakeholders. A concerted campaign to 
convince political leaders and voters alike of the efficacy 
of enacting such reforms, therefore, needs to be launched 
as early as possible. If a compromise on legislation is to be 
struck before early 2013, as set out in the Tokyo Declara-
tion, the international community will have to keep pressure 
on the government to consult widely across institutions 
and reach out to civil society and election observer groups. 
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Ill-defined institutional structures, weak administrative 
capacity and poor leadership in the electoral institutions 
have, as noted, greatly undercut public confidence in the 
political system. Although the constitution establishes the 
IEC as the lead institution responsible for administering 
elections, a failure to build consensus on supplementary 
laws to define its mandate and internal procedures has 
stymied efforts to make it truly independent. The IEC has 
consequently been caught in a tug of war between a pres-
ident bent on micromanaging all political competition and 
a parliament apparently incapable of resisting the lure of 
the politics of patronage and rent seeking.
73
 As with other 
government institutions, the IEC has also struggled to meet 
demands from donors who are far from coordinated, much 
less unified, in their approach. These challenges have con-
tinually sapped the organisation’s already limited capacity 
to administer itself efficiently and move forward with 
critical reforms.  
Seven commissioners sit on the IEC board, which sets 
policy and oversees a secretariat headed by a chief elec-
toral officer and comprising 34 provincial offices divided 
into eight regions. Before the 2009 presidential election, 
permanent staff was about 400; that number expanded, 
however, reaching 165,000, mostly temporary staff, on 
election day.74 After 2009, the IEC fired roughly 6,000 
staff implicated in fraud and introduced a new recruitment 
system.75 But the country’s chief electoral body continues 
to suffer charges of partisanship: commissioners are ap-
pointed by the president alone, and parliament has no legal 
avenues to influence that process.  
The battle over IEC appointments is likely to come into 
sharper focus in the months leading up to April 2013, when 
Chairman Manawi’s term expires. Karzai has not disclosed 
publicly whether he plans to reappoint him for another three 
years. However, the resignation in July 2012 of the IEC’s 
chief electoral officer, Abdullah Ahmadzai, one of its most 
experienced staffers, has cast a long shadow over the ap-
pointment process and raised fears again that external inter-
ference in staffing issues could further imperil institutional 
independence.
76
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76
 Zarghona Salehi, “Chief electoral officer resigns”, Pajhwok 
Afghan News Service, 9 July 2012. 
Several Afghan news outlets and long-time political ob-
servers predicted imminent changes in the IEC’s leader-
ship.
77
 Manawi, formerly a Supreme Court deputy justice, 
has frequently been discussed for one of the two vacancies 
on that court or as a potential attorney general. The presi-
dent’s chief of staff, Abdul Karim Khurram, has been 
considered a potential replacement for Manawi. A member 
of Hizb-e Islami Afghanistan, the unarmed wing of Gul-
buddin Hekmatyar’s pro-Islamist faction, he generates 
much controversy for reportedly pro-Pakistani, anti-U.S. 
views.
78
 His nomination would undoubtedly provoke ran-
cour both inside the deeply divided presidential palace 
and outside, particularly among non-Pashtun opposition 
leaders allied with the National Coalition of Afghanistan 
and the National Front. In late September, it appeared 
Karzai was reconsidering, after coming under considerable 
international pressure. The president should consult broadly 
to prevent the appointment process from bogging down in 
factional politics. 
Similar considerations apply to the appointment process 
for the ECC, but there the situation is in some ways even 
more perilous, since the complaints body remains only a 
temporary institution. Under the draft electoral law, it 
would continue to be dissolved within 30 days of the cer-
tification of election results. This could result in a repeat 
in 2014 of the disastrous handling of complaints witnessed 
in 2009 and 2010. To ensure institutional integrity and en-
courage the government’s capacity to manage the electoral 
complaints process, it needs to be made permanent. 
That would require a separate law outlining its mandate, 
structure and administrative procedures, as some civil so-
ciety groups have already suggested.
79
 A modicum of 
compromise over membership would be required both in 
parliament and between the lower house and the execu-
tive. As noted, above, the ECC board now is to contain 
three Afghans and two international experts. It is highly 
probable that in the current environment appointment of 
international experts would meet with even more virulent 
resistance than before. Any move to give the ECC per-
manent status thus would inevitably result in its “Afghan-
isation”. However, it is likely that international advisers 
would still be needed to assist with more technical aspects 
of the work. 
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If any progress is to be made, it must be understood that 
wrangling over appointments, hiring and training of new 
staff and purchase of equipment and materials at the start of 
each electoral cycle is cost-prohibitive. Given the financial 
constraints donors now face in allocating assistance, con-
verting the ECC into a permanent body makes fiscal as 
well as political sense. The international community should 
set accomplishment of this by spring 2013 as a leading 
benchmark for the release of further elections aid. 
3. ICSIC and Supreme Court 
The 2009 presidential and 2010 parliamentary elections 
sorely tested the unsteady balance between the three branch-
es of government. In both cases, constitutional ambiguities 
relating to the parameters of judicial review and competing 
interpretations of the Supreme Court’s mandate seriously 
complicated the resolution of disputes. The controversy 
surrounding the establishment of the Special Tribunal on 
Elections after the 2010 polls all but destroyed the credi-
bility of the Supreme Court and exposed glaring defects 
in the legislative framework governing the Independent 
Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of 
the Constitution (ICSIC). Unless the laws governing both 
bodies are modified and incorporated into the constitution 
through an amendment process, their institutional rivalries 
will probably bedevil the political system for years to come. 
The rivalry between the Supreme Court and the ICSIC 
dates back to 2003, when splits emerged in the Constitu-
tional Drafting Commission over the establishment of a 
high court empowered to interpret the constitution.
80
 There 
has been much wrangling since the 2004 constitution was 
adopted over the meaning of articles that appear to give 
judicial review powers to both bodies. The debate has fo-
cused primarily around two articles of the constitution. 
Article 121 states that “the Supreme Court shall review 
the laws, legislative decrees, international treaties as well 
as international covenants for their compliance with the 
Constitution and their interpretation in accordance with the 
law”. Article 157 merely establishes the ICSIC as a con-
stitutional body and describes appointment procedures for 
commissioners.
81
  
Neither expressly empowers one institution or the other to 
rule on whether actions by a branch of government violate 
the constitution. The constitution’s silence on that crucial 
element of judicial review has left both institutions vul-
nerable to interference by the president and parliament and 
has greatly distorted the balance of power. In the absence 
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 Crisis Group interview, Sarwar Danesh, former justice minis-
ter and member of the constitutional commission, Kabul, 24 
April 2012. 
81
 The president is empowered to appoint members to the ICSIC 
with parliamentary approval. 
of a clear mandate for the Supreme Court or the commission 
to independently conduct comprehensive judicial review, 
few avenues have been available for individual citizens or 
entities to challenge government actions or legislation. Dur-
ing the first four years following adoption of the constitution, 
the Supreme Court attempted to fill the vacuum by issuing 
several advisory opinions.
82
 These appeared for a time to 
establish it as the preeminent arbiter of the law. However, 
legislation in 2008 that established the structure, authority 
and responsibilities of the ICSIC and the appointment of 
five of seven commissioners in 2010 have challenged that 
authority. 
The judicial review mandate of the ICSIC, nonetheless, is 
far from firm or uncontested. Since only five of the com-
mission’s seven seats have been filled, a question remains 
as to whether it is in fact legally constituted. The imposi-
tion of four-year terms and dubious procedures included 
in the 2008 legislation for the dismissal of members raise 
serious concerns about its independence.
83
 Moreover, de-
spite claims to the contrary by members of parliament who 
have championed the ICSIC as the constitutional arbiter, 
it has done little to distinguish itself from the Supreme 
Court as a constitutional guardian. Only two of its advisory 
opinions – one pertaining to the U.S.-run prison at Bagram 
and a short statement condemning the burning of copies of 
the Quran at the prison – have been published, a far from 
impressive record. 
The tug of war between the two institutions has spread to 
the appointment process for the Supreme Court, where 
five of the nine seats on the bench will need to be filled by 
August 2013.
84
 The four-year terms of acting Chief Justice 
Abdul Salaam Azimi, Justice Zamin Ali Behsudi and Jus-
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terms on the Supreme Court High Council after the resignation of 
Chief Justice Fazl Hadi Shinwari in 2006. Per the constitution, 
three judges are appointed for ten years, three judges are ap-
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The following is a breakdown of each judge’s term: Bahaudin 
Baha, Mohammad Alim Nasimi and Abdul Rasheed Rashid, 
August 2006-July 2016; Ghulam Nabi Nawayee, Mohammad 
Omar Babrakzai and Abdul Aziz Aziz, August 2006-July 2013; 
Abdul Salaam Azimi, Zamin Ali Behsudi and Mohammad 
Qasim Dost, May 2006-April 2010. 
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tice Mohammad Qasim Dost all expired in July 2010. The 
president extended their three terms through a legally du-
bious decree and only initiated a nominating process for their 
replacements in May 2012. The seat of only one of the 
three judges with expired terms has now been filled, which 
means that two judges whose terms have already expired 
must still be replaced, in addition to the three whose terms 
expire in 2013.  
With the Supreme Court’s reputation already sullied by 
its performance during the 2010 elections, further uncer-
tainty around the justices’ terms will only exacerbate ten-
sions should it have to rule on issues pertaining to the 2014 
election. Appointing new judges to the Supreme Court and 
two commissioners to the ICSIC by early 2013 would be an 
important first step toward resolving this problem. In the 
end, however, the growing institutional rivalry between 
the high court and the commission can no more be resolved 
by presidential decree than it can by a simple parliamentary 
vote. In addition to electoral reforms, constitutional change 
will ultimately be necessary to restore the independence 
of the Supreme Court and to establish clear lines of authority 
between it and the ICSIC. 
While the mere suggestion of constitutional change has 
bred fears of a reversal in political gains made by women 
and minorities, there is strong agreement among members 
of the opposition – armed and unarmed – that the 2004 
constitution does not adequately address current needs. 
When a constitution is too inflexible, government easily falls 
victim to dysfunction, which can result in state collapse. 
None of Afghanistan’s attempts to form a foundational 
law have proved strong enough to accommodate insurgent 
demands while protecting the rights of minorities and women 
and assuring a means for all citizens to peacefully challenge 
abuse of state authority.  
In any national context, the path to protection against state 
abuse is fraught, but development of a consistent approach 
to these problems in Afghanistan has been complicated by 
a legal tradition that frowns on innovation and flexibility. 
Neither the government nor the international community 
has sufficiently addressed the political tensions and un-
certainty caused by the role of Islamic jurisprudence in the 
constitution, not to mention its potential impact on the 
security transition and the integrity of the Afghan state. 
President Karzai’s government has frequently cited respect 
for the constitution as a paramount condition of reconcili-
ation with the Taliban and other insurgent groups; the ex-
ecutive branch, however, has time and again demonstrat-
ed a belief that it is above the law, accountable only to the 
small circle of political elites that make up the core of 
Karzai’s constituency.  
Executive abuse of power against a backdrop of high vio-
lence and insecurity has set the stage for deep national 
debate over the need to strengthen the constitutional order 
and reinforce rule of law. To survive, political elites will 
need to strike an accord that gives as much freedom to 
Islamist factions to operate within the political system as 
it does to others. Protections for minorities and women 
must likewise be built into the political architecture and 
move beyond quotas to a system that incentivises broad 
participation over tokenism. It is highly unlikely that the 
current dispensation, which privileges presidential power 
over the other branches, can accommodate the varied needs 
of Islamist factions, women and minorities. A move to a 
parliamentary system is required to ensure the broadest 
possible access to government and enfranchisement of 
Afghan citizens. Constitutional change is an inevitable step 
toward negotiating a lasting peace with all elements of the 
opposition. The sooner the government and its international 
backers acknowledge this, the closer the country will be 
to a path toward sustainable stability.  
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III. TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES 
Multiple technical glitches marred conduct of the 2009 and 
2010 polls, leading to widespread fraud. Several of these 
problems could have been prevented by early action on the 
part of the government and international community. The 
key technical tasks and challenges that must be addressed 
ahead of the 2014 and 2015 elections remain the same, 
including creation of a viable voter registry; a comprehen-
sive practical evaluation of the geographic distribution of 
polling centres; allocation of ballot materials; ensuring secu-
rity; and voter education. 
The flawed voter registry has been a problem for years. 
Tight timelines for the first presidential election set by the 
2001 Bonn Agreement left little opportunity to conduct a 
census or negotiate electoral districts.
85
 An estimated 10.6 
million citizens were, nonetheless, registered inside the 
country and another 740,000 outside it (primarily in Paki-
stan and Iran) before the 2004 election. In 2005, the regis-
try was updated and another 1.7 million voter cards were 
distributed. Subsequent additions and updates ultimately 
resulted in the distribution of roughly seventeen million 
voter cards ahead of the 2009 polls, a figure that probably 
exceeds the number of eligible voters by about six million.
86
 
Rationalising and updating the voter registry has posed 
considerable challenges, given the lack of systematised 
geographical information and standard personal identifi-
cation documents, as well as longstanding disagreements 
over district boundaries. In 2010, the communication and 
information technology ministry announced a plan designed 
in part to address these problems with the launch of a $100 
million electronic national identification system.
87
 It was 
intended to distribute fifteen million national identifica-
tion cards by 2013, but progress has stalled, reportedly due 
to a political tussle between senior members of that ministry 
and the interior ministry over the lucrative contracts asso-
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ciated with the project.
88
 Several Afghan officials assert 
that presidential support for the program has been eroded 
by fears it will challenge the long-held assumption that Pash-
tuns are a numerical majority in the population. A senior elec-
tions official noted: 
This process needs real cooperation from all sides, but 
it seems that someone in the palace believes that it could 
upset our ideas about ethnicity in the country. Maybe 
they believe that this exercise would change the way we 
understand ethnic balance, and that’s why they are not 
so keen to pursue this process to the end. From our point 
of view, we don’t see any technical problems with the 
[national ID distribution] process. It’s problematic, but 
it’s not impossible. It’s just a matter of political will.89 
In any case, it seems highly unlikely that the national ID 
process will be completed in time for the 2014 elections, 
leaving few options to correct the current voter list. An 
August 2012 feasibility study conducted by UNDP con-
cluded that mere update efforts would essentially dupli-
cate previous attempts, and inconsistencies with data on 
record would confuse matters further. It recommended that 
an entirely new voter registry be compiled using a phased 
approach in which voters would register at specified polling 
centres across the country over six months. In insecure and 
remote areas, they would be allowed to register at a polling 
centre one or two days before the election. Some 16,000 
teams would use optical mark technology to match voter 
cards to the list, at an estimated cost of $79.1 million.
90
 
Experts familiar with the proposal are optimistic about its 
viability but warn that procurement and logistical hurdles 
will increase as the campaign season approaches. The IEC 
will need to launch the new registration process no later 
than November 2012 if the effort is to succeed.
91
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IV. SECURITY CHALLENGES 
The completion of a new voter registry exercise will, of 
course, depend heavily on security conditions on the ground 
ahead of and during the 2014 polls. Security has progres-
sively worsened since the first elections were held in 2004, 
despite a massive injection of international aid and military 
resources. Even as NATO has invested heavily in building 
the ANSF in recent years, insurgents have demonstrated 
determination to capture the strategic narrative and expose 
the government’s weaknesses, including by several spec-
tacular attacks in and around the capital, Kabul, and in stra-
tegically critical cities such as Kandahar and Jalalabad.
 92
  
The situation worsened considerably in the wake of the 
September 2010 polls, which saw violence hit an all-time 
high on election day. Security further deteriorated shortly 
after President Karzai announced plans to begin transfer-
ring responsibility for it in several parts of the country from 
NATO to the government by July 2011.
93
 The downward 
trend continued almost unabated through much of 2011 
and early 2012. Following an unusually severe winter that 
saw record snowfalls and lasted well into late March 2012, 
civilian casualties dropped by nearly 15 per cent to 1,154 
killed and 1,954 injured in the first half of the year. This 
trend saw a marked reverse over the summer months, with 
UNAMA noting that August 2012 was the second deadliest 
month on record: 374 civilians killed and 581 injured.94  
Statistics demonstrate a notable increase overall in target-
ed killings of civilians and government officials, from 94 
during January-June 2009 to 255 for the same six-month 
period in 2012.
95
 More than a dozen members of parlia-
ment have been killed since the first elections in 2005, and 
eleven candidates were killed during the 2010 campaign.
96
 
Scores of mid-level government officials have recently been 
assassinated, as insurgents have ramped up such opera-
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tions.
97
 Likewise, Afghans who work for non-governmental 
organisations and development agencies are regularly tar-
geted, and intimidation campaigns frequently force them to 
live outside their home villages. The Taliban’s use of targeted 
killings and threats has been especially effective most recently 
in the north-eastern provinces of Nuristan and Kunar, where 
cross-border shelling between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
has additionally plagued an already exposed population.98 
As the 2014 campaign approaches and political competition 
heats up, targeted killings are likely to increase, a phenom-
enon witnessed repeatedly since 2003.
99
  
It has become increasingly clear that ISAF is unable to 
dislodge the Taliban from its strongholds in the south and 
east. A widening trust deficit between NATO and Afghan 
forces has also put ISAF further on the defensive. The Tali-
ban, the Haqqani network and other affiliated insurgent 
actors have exploited these weaknesses by sending fighters 
into particularly vulnerable areas such as Kunar, Nuristan, 
Paktika, Paktia, Ghazni, Wardak and Logar.100  
ISAF and Western officials have repeatedly stated that 
conditions on the ground will dictate the pace of NATO’s 
withdrawal, emphasising that Afghan forces will reach 
their peak of 352,000 as the international drawdown ac-
celerates in late 2012. Planning for the massive logistical 
challenge of withdrawing more than 100,000 troops is well 
underway, however, and the exercise is likely to absorb a 
considerable portion of deployed international military 
resources. By September, U.S. troops in country were down 
from about 100,000 to 68,000, returning their strength to 
the pre-2009 surge level. Already by April, security in 
138 districts across twenty provinces and with half the 
country’s population had been placed under the control of 
Afghan forces. ISAF commander General John Allen has 
said that he will require “significant combat power in 2013”, 
but few additional specifics on the pace of the U.S. draw-
down have been offered.
101
  
A little more than 39,000 troops from 50 other NATO 
troop-contributing nations were operating in summer 
2012, but reductions in these non-U.S. NATO forces have 
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also already begun. Canada ended its combat mission in 
2011, and France’s estimated 3,200 will probably have left 
by the end of 2012. By the end of 2012, 500 of 9,000 UK 
troops are expected to exit, and London has indicated it is 
considering accelerating withdrawals. In April 2012, Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard announced that Australia planned 
to withdraw its 1,550 by the end of 2013. Although many 
individual NATO missions have emphasised the intention 
to maintain a phased withdrawal through the end of 2014, 
significant troop reductions starting in 2013 are also an-
ticipated from Germany, Spain, Italy and several other con-
tributing nations.
102
 
Although the ANSF continues to make progress in meeting 
growth benchmarks, there are serious concerns about op-
erational capabilities. Attrition rates have remained con-
sistently high, and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan 
(NTM-A) has been unable to increase recruitment among 
Pashtuns in the south. Literacy levels among Afghan sol-
diers and police are exceptionally low, despite encouraging 
NTM-A efforts to provide literacy training for roughly 
198,000 soldiers and police. Afghan forces still lag behind, 
meanwhile, in critical areas such as logistics, supply and air 
power. All these factors will impact the success of a tran-
sition strategy that calls for their reduction from the 352,000 
anticipated in October 2012 to 228,500 by 2017.
103
 
Little thought, meanwhile, appears to have been given to 
the economic implications of ISAF proposals to close 
hundreds of military installations. With a proposed rate of 
twenty base closures per month, including those of Pro-
vincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), the impact on local 
economies will be tremendous and could lead to rapid de-
terioration of security.
104
 Factional competition over dwin-
dling resources across the security services could sharply 
undermine unit cohesion and impede operational capacity. 
Analyses of the defence and interior ministries indicate that 
neither meets the standard of independence or compe-
tence in any category and that in several key areas they have 
not progressed at all. Low operational capacity has been a 
perennial problem and is not likely to substantially im-
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prove in the near term. Only 7 per cent of army (ANA) and 
9 per cent of national police (ANP) units are considered 
capable of independent action even with advisers.
105
  
The majority of officials in the upper echelons of the two 
ministries are at retirement age or older and have retained 
their posts through well-established patronage networks 
that have hindered leadership development in the minis-
tries as in the officer corps. This in turn impacts rank-and-
file morale, particularly among non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs), who often must bear the brunt of poor senior 
leadership while managing resentments and rivalries among 
those under their command. As a veteran Afghan security 
official recently put it: 
Today in Afghanistan you do not have a national army. 
You do not have a national police. A factionalised gov-
ernment can only create a factionalised army and police. 
It is not a question of ethnic balance; it is a question of 
factional balance. People in the army and police are 
fighting for their factions, not the country.
106
 
It is difficult to overestimate the corrosive effect of faction-
alism in the ANSF officer corps and the risks it poses to 
continued NATO support for a long-term training and ad-
visory mission. Pervasive fears of Taliban infiltration of 
Afghan forces may be well founded, but analysis suggests 
that lack of cohesion between officers and rank and file in 
both police and army has expanded opportunities for infil-
tration, as well as increased internal friction between rival 
factions in the armed forces. The killings of NATO officers 
in Kabul at the interior ministry and in Kandahar in Feb-
ruary 2012 and the sharp rise of “green-on-blue” attacks 
that followed are strong examples of the widening trust 
deficit between the heavily factionalised ANSF and the 
Balkanised ISAF command.
107
 Such insider attacks account 
for 13 per cent of ISAF deaths in 2012. The astounding 
increase in such attacks and fears over weakness in vetting 
procedures led the U.S. to temporarily halt recruitment 
for the controversial local police program in September. 
In August 2012 alone, fifteen of 53 ISAF soldiers killed 
(28 per cent) were victims of fratricidal attacks.
108
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Although the early years of the NATO training mission 
witnessed a number of green-on-blue incidents, they were 
little noticed at the time. The numbers have increased, and 
reports suggest that ISAF officials have sought to sup-
press details about some.
109
 The attempt to spin these attacks 
as isolated occurrences appears to have blinded ISAF lead-
ership to the risks they might pose to overall perceptions of 
the mission. Insurgent infiltration only partially explains the 
recent wave. Attacks on NATO advisers are as much a 
product of frustration between Afghan soldiers and police 
and their NATO handlers and of tensions between Afghan 
security leaders at the regional command level and in Kabul 
over access to resources and political power.
110
 The sooner 
ISAF leadership acknowledges that obvious fact publicly, 
the quicker it may find a workable solution to the problem. 
Otherwise, ISAF may be forced to continue to respond to 
insider attacks by imposing ad hoc restrictions on the train-
ing and partnering mission, as it did in September, to the 
peril of the overall mission.
111
 
These trends have unfolded against a backdrop of deep 
political uncertainty in the wake of Karzai’s move to re-
shuffle his cabinet after the parliament forced out several 
veteran security sector heavyweights. A major shake-up 
in the security ministries and provincial governorships in 
August and September 2012 signalled that the president is 
preparing to become the main kingmaker in 2014.112 The 
long-time defence minister, Rahim Wardak, the interior 
minister, Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, and the National 
Directorate of Security (NDS) chief, Rahmatullah Nabil, 
resigned, the first two after parliament voted overwhelm-
ingly for their removal in the wake of skirmishes between 
Afghan and Pakistani forces near the eastern border. Na-
bil followed, after the president announced he would be 
taking up an ambassadorship in an as yet unnamed country. 
Given Wardak’s advanced age and poor health and the 
mixed reviews on his performance as minister, his removal 
surprised few.
113
 Mohammadi’s ouster, however, was met 
with ambivalence that soon gave way to confusion after 
Karzai nominated him to replace Wardak at defence. 
After a few tense weeks of behind-the-scenes horse-trading, 
parliament approved Mohammadi in his new post in Sep-
tember and backed the Karzai family’s long-time associate, 
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Asadullah Khaled, to replace Nabil at NDS.
114
 A Pashtun 
from Ghazni who served briefly as chief of the provincial 
directorate of NDS, later as governor of Ghazni and Kan-
dahar and most recently as tribal and border affairs minis-
ters, he has been criticised by human rights groups after 
investigations by the Canadian government alleged that he 
may have promoted the use of torture in government in-
terrogations of suspected insurgents while he was in Kan-
dahar. Khaled has publicly refuted these allegations, and 
he has been vigorously defended by a number of prominent 
government officials.
115
 His appointment to lead the top 
intelligence agency sends a strong signal that Karzai is 
increasingly concerned about consolidating security control 
at the local level in pivotal provinces such as Ghazni and 
Kandahar, where every ballot counted will undoubtedly be 
significant for the outcome of the elections. 
As political competition heats up in the approach to the 
elections, there is a genuine risk that internecine competi-
tion between leaders of factions within the ANSF could 
lead not only to more green-on-blue incidents, but also to 
an increase in already high attrition rates and, in the worst 
case, disintegration of command and control soon after 
U.S. and NATO forces withdraw. Such scenarios do not 
bode well for long-term ANSF sustainability. In the short-
term, ISAF will need to remain on alert to the vulnerabilities 
created by fragmentation within security institutions. In the 
longer term, the Afghan government and international 
forces will need to reassess the type of security assistance 
given to the Afghan forces and may need to halt altogether 
programs such as the Afghan Local Police, which are par-
ticularly prone to insurgent infiltration.  
Assurances from NATO and U.S. military commanders 
aside, there can be little doubt that levels of insecurity are 
likely to remain high, if not increase, ahead of the 2014 
presidential election.
116
 With the majority of Afghan secu-
rity forces unable to meet even the most basic operational 
benchmarks, particularly in the crucial areas of supply, 
logistics and air support, it seems highly improbable that 
they will be able to fill the gaps left by departing interna-
tional forces by the time the campaign gets underway in 
earnest in late 2013.
117
 Simply put, security conditions will 
likely be far from ideal for the 2014 elections. 
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It is encouraging that ISAF plans to establish a task force 
to look at security-related contingencies for the presiden-
tial and provincial council polls.
118
 Particular attention 
will need to be paid to the impact of election preparations 
on the demand for more air resources at what is likely to 
be a highly volatile and kinetic period of the transition pro-
cess. The greater the number of clashes between Afghan 
forces and insurgents, the higher the risk of increased casu-
alties among government forces. Afghan military officials 
have frequently complained about the adverse impact of 
insufficient air medevac services and their heavy reliance 
on ISAF for air support.119 International military officials 
on the ground must be wary, however, of allowing the 
planning exercise to become overly politicised and should 
resist the temptation to bow to any pressure from Wash-
ington and other capitals to make promises that ISAF and 
Afghan forces cannot keep. Close coordination and open 
channels of communication between the IEC, ISAF and the 
defence and interior ministries will be vital in that regard.  
Violence has remained consistently high in the south and 
east, and election security has historically proven a chal-
lenge in volatile provinces such as Kandahar, Helmand, 
Paktika, Paktia, Ghazni and Uruzgan. In the fall of 2010, 
the IEC closed about 23 per cent of the nearly 20,000 
polling stations planned for election day due to insecurity.
120
 
The commission could well conclude in 2014 that the 
presidential election can only be held in certain parts of 
the country, or at the least that significant centre closures 
are necessary, thus again preventing thousands of citizens 
in the south and the east from voting.
121
 Such an outcome 
would undoubtedly spark accusations of fraud and charges 
that election results were skewed, likely precipitating a pro-
longed crisis over the transfer of power from President Kar-
zai to his successor.  
International military officials can ill-afford to make prom-
ises they cannot keep at this most delicate time in the mission. 
ISAF and Afghan security officials would do well to begin 
planning now for the possibility that elections may only be 
held in limited areas of the country, if at all. Planning 
should also begin for the possibility that a run-off will be 
required between the two candidates receiving the most 
votes; it is highly improbable that a second round could 
take place under tight security conditions in the two-week 
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timetable prescribed by the constitution.122 This raises the 
possibility that there could be a need for an interim gov-
ernmental arrangement while the run-off is organised. At 
the very least, international and Afghan security officials 
should begin discussions now about these contingencies 
and map out potential scenarios and responses to a pro-
longed period without a presidential election or in which 
no clear winner emerges from a first round and a run-off is 
required or a state of emergency is imposed. In such cir-
cumstances, failure to have planned for the worst could 
hasten the Afghan government’s implosion.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Afghanistan’s political leaders have a maximum of eighteen 
months to prepare for an election and ensure a smooth 
transfer of presidential power. Many key tasks must be 
finished much earlier, particularly regarding electoral over-
sight. Resolving both the long crisis over electoral admin-
istration and related constitutional disputes could well be 
the key to determining whether the current political system 
will survive the 2014 NATO drawdown. Failure in either 
would be a crippling blow to chances to generate popular 
trust in a regime already regarded as highly corrupt. The 
international community must realise this is its last best 
chance to leave a viable state in Afghanistan and mobilise 
accordingly.  
The Afghan government has no alternative: it must move 
fast to ensure that electoral laws are passed in a timely 
manner; defects in the constitutional order are addressed; 
and rule of law is reinforced as the transition unfolds. All 
stakeholders must understand that rule of law is the most 
essential ingredient in the recipe for stability. The divide 
over the timing and administration of the elections and 
over the authority of rival judicial institutions to intervene 
in electoral disputes threatens to unravel the system en-
tirely. Failure to set a timetable for elections by Decem-
ber 2012 would exacerbate tensions and increase the like-
lihood of massive fraud at the polls in 2014. 
It is not likely that many in the political elite view the 
problem in this light. The danger is that President Karzai’s 
top priority is maintaining control, either directly or through 
a trusted proxy. He and other leading members of the elite 
may be able to cobble together a broad temporary alliance, 
but political competition is likely to turn violent on the 
heels of NATO’s withdrawal. There is a genuine risk that 
security and political developments within the next year 
could induce the president to invoke a state of emergency. 
Such a move would not only imperil the state itself but 
would also undoubtedly encourage the international com-
munity’s financial and political as well as further military 
disengagement. This would accelerate state collapse and 
likely precipitate the next civil war in the country. If that 
occurs, there would be few opportunities to reverse course 
in the near term. Securing the peace in Afghanistan would 
then remain at best a very distant hope. 
Kabul/Brussels, 8 October 2012
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APPENDIX B 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
 
AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 
ANA Afghan National Army 
ANP Afghan National Police 
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces 
ECC Electoral Complaints Commission 
HOO High Office of Oversight 
ICSIC Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution 
IEC Independent Election Commission 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
LV-PR Limited Vote-Proportional Representation electoral system 
NTM-A NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan 
SNTV Single Non-Transferable Vote electoral system 
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
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The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde-
pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 
130 staff members on five continents, working through 
field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and 
resolve deadly conflict. 
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams 
of political analysts are located within or close by countries 
at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent con-
flict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it 
produces analytical reports containing practical recommen-
dations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis 
Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly 
bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of 
play in all the most significant situations of conflict or po-
tential conflict around the world. 
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and made available simultaneously on the 
website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely 
with governments and those who influence them, including 
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate 
support for its policy prescriptions. 
The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures 
from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media 
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recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers 
around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. 
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